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The Coase conjecture with incomplete information
on the monopolist’s commitment
KyungMin Kim
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist’s inability to commit to a price,
which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by
low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with
respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular, there is uncertainty over
whether the monopolist is committed to a price (i.e. she may be a commitment
type). Consequently, consumers are no longer certain that the price will change
over time. I consider two kinds of commitment types. A behavioral commitment
type charges an exogenously given price, while the rational commitment type op-
timally chooses a price. I show that the Coase conjecture is robust with regard to
uncertainty over the monopolist’s commitment. When the probability of behav-
ioraltypesissufﬁcientlysmall,asintheoriginalCoaseconjecture,themonopolist
earns the competitive proﬁt. When the probability of behavioral types is positive,
unlikeintheoriginalCoaseconjecture,thereispositivedelay. Butthedelaydisap-
pears as the probability approaches zero. When the commitment type is rational,
unless the probability of the commitment type is sufﬁciently high, both normal
and committed monopolists charge the competitive price, and thus there is no
delay.
Keywords. Coase conjecture, reputational bargaining, rational commitment.
JEL classification. C72, C78, D82.
1. Introduction
A durable goods monopolist has an incentive to lower her price over time to make fur-
ther sales. But consumers, anticipating lower prices in the future, delay purchases un-
less the monopolist offers a reasonable price. When consumers are patient, the monop-
olistchargesthecompetitivepriceimmediately,andthusthereisnodelay. Inadynamic
environment, the presence of monopoly creates no distortion in allocations. This is the
well-known Coase conjecture.
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A key to this result is that consumers believe that the price is falling toward the com-
petitive price sufﬁciently quickly. These beliefs are generated by a lack of commitment
by the monopolist to price and make consumers reluctant to accept a high price. In
contrast, if consumers could be convinced that the price would not change, they would
accept a high price immediately. The monopolist would charge the static monopoly
price and earn the static monopoly proﬁt.
This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to con-
sumers’ beliefs about a lack of commitment by the monopolist to price. I perturb the
standard durable goods monopoly environment so that consumers are no longer cer-
tain that the price will change over time. Formally, I introduce incomplete information
on the monopolist’s commitment to price. A commitment type of the monopolist is one
who is committed to a price, that is, who cannot adjust the price over time. In the pres-
ence of commitment types, consumers face non-trivial decision problems. Without un-
certainty, they are certain that the price will drop soon. With uncertainty, the price may
not fall, in which case consumers prefer an early purchase. Consumers’ decision prob-
lems are complicated more by the fact that the normal monopolist has an incentive to
build a reputation as a commitment type.
I consider two kinds of commitment types. A behavioral commitment type (in short,
behavioral type) has no payoff concerns and always offers an exogenously given price.
The rational commitment type optimally chooses a price, knowing that she cannot ad-
justitlater. Theformertypecorrespondstoasimplecommitmenttypeinthereputation
literature, while the latter type is new.1 The introduction of behavioral types highlights
the normal type’s incentive to build a reputation as a commitment type, while studying
the model with the rational commitment type is of interest for the following reasons.
First, the rational commitment type is the monopolist who, if her type is known to con-
sumers, charges the static monopoly price and achieves the static monopoly proﬁt. In
thissense,therationalcommitmenttypecanbethoughtofasthemonopolistwithcom-
mitment power, whose behavior has long been studied in the literature. Second, the ra-
tional commitment type provides a way to endogenize the behavior of the commitment
type. It captures the following beliefs of consumers: if the monopolist is committed to
a price, the price maximizes her expected payoff conditional on her not being able to
adjust the price. Last, some institutional features may induce bargainers to behave like
the rational commitment type. For instance, a monopolist may hire a salesman without
givinghimtheauthoritytobargainovertheprice. Inaddition,inwagebargaining(inter-
national trade negotiation), the ﬁrm (opposite party) may be uncertain over the union
leader’s (bargaining ofﬁcial’s) level of delegation from the rank and ﬁle (government or
voters).
I ﬁnd that the Coase conjecture is robust with regard to uncertainty over the mo-
nopolist’s commitment. I distinguish between two implications of the Coase conjec-
ture: (1) the monopolist earns the competitive proﬁt (proﬁt implication), and (2) there
is nodelay (efﬁciency implication). While thesetwo are indistinguishable inthe original
Coase conjecture, the current setting shows that they are distinct.
1To the best of my knowledge, Kambe (1999) is the only paper that considers this type and studies a
related strategic problem in a dynamic environment.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 19
When the probability of behavioral types is small, the normal monopolist charges
more than the competitive price, but earns only the competitive proﬁt. Therefore, the
proﬁtimplicationoftheCoaseconjectureisrobustinastrongsense,whiletheefﬁciency
result (no delay) does not hold whenever the probability of behavioral types is positive.
Since delay becomes negligible as the probability of behavioral types vanishes, the ef-
ﬁciency implication is also robust, though not as strong as the proﬁt implication. To
see how this happens, suppose there is a single behavioral type who charges more than
the competitive price. The normal monopolist offers the same price because she has
an incentive to build a reputation as the commitment type. When the probability of the
behavioral type is small, consumers believe that the price is likely to drop in the future
and, therefore, delay purchases. If the seller keeps offering the high price, some con-
sumers accept the price, but a majority of consumers wait, hoping for the price to fall.
When the probability of the behavioral type is small and consequently consumers have
a strong incentive to wait, the loss of proﬁt from delayed purchases completely offsets
the gain from selling to some consumers at the high price.2 The conclusions carry over
to the case with multiple behavioral types. This is because in equilibrium consumers’
beliefs over the seller’s type are determined so that the normal monopolist is indifferent
between all prices she may offer. This ensures that when the unconditional probability
of behavioral types is small, the probability of the behavioral type (consumers’ beliefs
over the seller’s type) conditional on a price is small uniformly over all prices.
When the commitment type is rational, unless the probability of the commitment
type is sufﬁciently high, both the normal and committed monopolists offer the compet-
itive price immediately and earn the competitive proﬁt. Therefore, both implications of
theCoaseconjecturearerobustinastrongsense. Thoughtherationalcommitmenttype
chooses a price, conditional on her choosing any given price the situation amounts to
the one with a single behavioral type. Consequently, when the probability of the com-
mitment type is small, both the rational commitment type and the normal type earn
only the competitive proﬁt. The reason why the efﬁciency implication is also strongly
robust is as follows. A monopolist generally has an incentive to avoid the delay cost by
lowering the price. This incentive is particularly large to the rational commitment type
who must endure all delay cost. When the rational commitment type expects no more
than the competitive proﬁt, it is optimal for her to offer the competitive price. Then the
normal type has no choice but to offer the competitive price as well.
Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982), Fudenberg et al. (1985), Gul et al. (1986), and Ausubel
and Deneckere (1989) are classic papers on the Coase conjecture. They are concerned
with the conjecture itself, while the interest of this paper is its robustness. McAfee and
Wiseman (2008) consider the Coase conjecture with a capacity constraint. They show
that, no matter how small is the capacity cost, the monopolist achieves at least 29.8%
2Another way to understand this result is to consider the problem in the reputation context. The nor-
mal monopolist establishes a reputation as the commitment type, while consumers pretend to have lower
valuations. Since this is a two-sided reputation game, who is better off depends on each player’s degree
of uncertainty over the opponent’s type. The monopolist is better off only when the possibility of commit-
ment(theseller’sbargainingpower)outweighsthenaturaltendencyofconsumerstopretendtohavelower
valuations (the buyer’s bargaining power).20 KyungMin Kim Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
of the static monopoly proﬁt, and thus the Coase conjecture does not hold. The crucial
idea is that, with a capacity constraint that is observable to consumers, the monopolist
can effectively commit to quantity instead of price.
Another branch of the literature upon which this paper builds studies reputational
bargaining. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1988) study a bilateral bargaining game with
two-sided incomplete information over fundamentals (the buyer’s valuation and the
seller’s production cost) and characterize the equilibrium, which features a war of at-
trition.3 Myerson (1991) was the ﬁrst to introduce into the bargaining context the
commitment (irrational or obstinate) type, which had been widely studied in repeated
gamesfollowingtheseminalworksofKrepsandWilson(1982)andMilgromandRoberts
(1982). He shows that in an alternating offer bargaining game with one-sided incom-
plete information, as bargaining friction becomes negligible, agreement occurs imme-
diately on the outcome that would prevail when a party is known to be stubborn. Abreu
andGul(2000)generalizeMyerson’sinsightandstudyatwo-sidedreputationalbargain-
ing game. In their setting, there are multiple behavioral types and each normal type
chooses a behavioral type to mimic. They demonstrate that the equilibrium in con-
tinuous time is unique and has a war-of-attrition structure. Furthermore, they show
that the equilibrium in discrete time converges to the unique equilibrium in continu-
ous time, independent of the exact bargaining protocol so long as both players make
offers frequently. Kambe (1999) considers the setting in which players become stub-
born with positive probability after making their initial demands. He also analyzes the
case in which players know their types before making their demands. The second case
is analogous to the rational commitment type in this paper. Compte and Jehiel (2002)
investigatetheroleofoutsideoptionsinthereputationalbargainingenvironment. They
show that outside options may cancel out the effect of obstinacy, in the sense that play-
ers reveal their rationality as soon as possible.
The closest paper to this one is Inderst (2005). He studies the case in which there is
a single behavioral type. This case serves as the building block in this paper, but has the
following limitations. First, with a single behavioral type, all prices other than the com-
petitive price and the price offered by the behavioral type are irrelevant. My model with
multiple behavioral types endogenizes the set of equilibrium prices and yields results
that do not rely on the speciﬁc price offer. Second, in the model with a single behavioral
type, the probability that the seller is the commitment type conditional on the price
offer is equal to its unconditional probability, which is exogenously given. My model
with multiple behavioral types endogenizes the conditional probabilities and allows me
to address an interesting question in the presence of commitment types: which price
is more credible? Do consumers believe that the price is more likely to drop when the
initial price is higher or lower? Last, it turns out that many equilibria in the game with
the rational commitment type are not robust to the introduction of a small probabil-
ity of multiple behavioral types. This equilibrium selection is not possible with a single
behavioral type.
3A war-of-attrition structure is assumed in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987), while it is derived as an
equilibrium property in their 1988 paper.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 21
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section studies the
game with a single behavioral type. In addition, I provide some deﬁnitions and facts
thatareusefulinthesubsequentsections. Sections3and4examinethegamewithmul-
tiple behavioral types and the game with the rational commitment type, respectively. I
conclude by discussing some relevant issues in Section 5. I also analyze the full-ﬂedged
game in which both behavioral types and the rational commitment type are active. The
full-ﬂedgedgameisnecessaryfortheequilibriumselectioninSection4,butrathercom-
plicated. I provide an intuition for the selection in Section 4 and defer the analysis of the
full-ﬂedged game to the Appendix.
2. Single behavioral type: the building block
2.1 Setup
Thebasicsetupisthestandarddurablegoodsmonopolyproblem. Thisproblemisiden-
ticalto thebilateral sequentialbargaining gamein whichthe buyerhas privateinforma-
tion about his valuation and the seller makes all the offers. The seller’s production cost
is known and normalized to 0. The buyer’s valuation, v, is drawn from a distribution
function F with support [v,v], 0 < v < v < 1.4 The distribution function F has a pos-
itive and continuously differentiable density f . At each date t  0, the seller makes an
offer and the buyer decides whether to accept the offer. The common discount factor is
 =e r, whereistheofferintervalandr isthediscountrate. Thisgamehasaunique
sequential equilibrium in which the price falls to v in a ﬁnite time (see Fudenberg et al.
1985 or Gul et al. 1986). As  approaches 1, the seller offers a price close to v and delay
disappears in the limit.
I study a perturbation of this game in which the seller is committed to a price p 2
(v,v) with probability . With the complementary probability, the seller is the same
type as in the original game (the normal type). For analytical tractability, I focus on the
continuous-time game. In continuous time, the Coasian dynamics force the seller to
immediately lower the price to v in case her type is revealed to be normal. Since any
price revision reveals the seller’s type to be normal, I can assume that at each time and
history, the normal type has only two options: continuing to offer the same price as the
commitment type and offering the competitive price, v. For completeness, I assume
that once the seller offers v, she keeps offering v after any history. For the convergence
of the discrete-time game to the continuous-time game, see Inderst (2005).
2.2 Characterization
To understand the equilibrium structure, suppose there is a completely separating
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the buyer accepts p immediately whenever his
4The “gap” assumption v > 0 makes the seller immediately lower the price to v once the buyer’s valua-
tion is known to be close to v. With no gap (v = 0), the Coase conjecture may not hold (see Ausubel and
Deneckere 1989). The gap assumption plays another role in my model, which is to make the normal type
exhaust her reputation. The latter role is clariﬁed in the last section, when I examine the limit equilibrium
as v !0.22 KyungMin Kim Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
valuation is higher than p. Since the normal type achieves only v, it is a proﬁtable de-
viation for the normal type to offer p ﬁrst and lower to v an instant later. Now sup-
pose there is a completely pooling equilibrium. The buyer again accepts p immediately
whenever his valuation is higher than p. Then the normal type lowers the price to v an
instant later. Therefore, as is common in many reputation games, the normal type plays
a mixed strategy in equilibrium.
Characterizing equilibrium in this type of reputation game is difﬁcult in general.
Abreu and Gul (2000), however, show that the equilibrium analysis is tractable in the
bargaining context. Their analysis builds on the following two observations. First, once
a party is revealed to be normal, the Coasian dynamics force him to accept the oppo-
nent’s demand immediately in continuous time. Second, given the ﬁrst observation, the
only strategic issue is to ﬁnd the optimal concession times for the players to reveal their
rationality, and the underlying structure of this concession game is a war of attrition.
ThoughAbreuandGulstudyavariantoftheRubinsteinbargaininggame, thispaper
and their paper have similar equilibrium structures. Indeed, if the buyer’s valuation is
drawn from a binary distribution in my problem, the equilibrium characterization is
straightforward from Abreu and Gul. Given a price higher than the low valuation, the
normal type seller and the high valuation buyer mix between conceding and waiting
overatimeinterval. Theirconcessionprobabilitiesaredeterminedsothattheopponent
is indifferent between conceding and waiting at each time.
With a continuum of buyer valuations, the analysis is not immediate from Abreu
and Gul. Before presenting the results, I note that this extension is different from an
extension to the case with multiple behavioral types. With multiple behavioral types,
an additional issue is which behavioral type each player chooses to mimic. Conditional
on those choices, the game reduces to the one with a single behavioral type. With a
continuum of buyer valuations, a different type of war of attrition arises.
An equilibrium is characterized by (GS,) where GS : R+ ! [0,1] is the seller’s un-
conditional concession probability distribution and  : [v,v] ! R+ [f1g is the buyer’s
concessionfunction. ThenumberGS(t)isthecumulativeprobabilitythatthesellercon-
cedes (offers v) by time t, conditional on the buyer not having accepted the previous of-
fers. Thenumber(v)istheoptimalconcessiontimeofthetypev buyer,conditionalon
the seller not having lowered the price. Since the commitment type seller and the buyer
with a valuation lower than p never concede, GS(t)  1 ,8t and (v) = 1,8v < p.
In addition, deﬁne GB : R+ ! [0,1] by GB(t) = Prfv : (v)  tg. The function GB is the
buyer’s unconditional concession probability distribution.
The following measure can be interpreted as the buyer’s bargaining power and plays













This is one way to measure how left-skewed the distribution is relative to p. If F ﬁrst-Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 23
order stochastically dominates F0, then (F,p)  (F0,p).5 Intuitively, the more likely
the buyer has a valuation lower than p, the more easily he can pretend to have a valua-
tion lower than p, and consequently, the stronger his bargaining power. The function 
is strictly increasing in p because the buyer has a greater incentive to wait when facing
a higher price.
The characterization results are summarized in the following proposition, which is
a rewriting of Proposition 1 in Inderst (2005).














if p v  F 1(cB)












































dv +ln=0 if >(F,p).
The equilibrium changes qualitatively at  = (F,p). If  > (F,p), then the buyer
concedes (accepts the offer p) with positive probability at date 0. If  < (F,p), then
the seller concedes (offers v) with positive probability at date 0. If  = (F,p), then no
player immediately concedes with positive probability.
I provide the idea of the proof, highlighting similarities and differences between the
two-type case (Abreu and Gul) and the continuum type case (Inderst and this paper).
As in Abreu and Gul, the normal type randomizes over a time interval. Therefore,






The left-hand side is the marginal cost of waiting an instant more, while the right-hand
side is the corresponding marginal beneﬁt. The latter consists of the conditional con-






















Since F(v) F 0(v) for all v, (F,p)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instead of v. This ordinary differential equation has a closed-form solution, GB(t) =
1 cB exp( vrt=(p  v)) where cB 2[F(p),1] is a constant.
Unlike in Abreu and Gul, each buyer type has his own optimal concession time.




(p  v) for v >p and (v)>0.
That is, the marginal cost (the left-hand side) and the marginal beneﬁt (the right-hand
side) of delay for the type v buyer are equated at his optimal concession time, (v). By












































The two unknowns, cB and cS, are found in the same way as in Abreu and Gul. First,
a player prefers waiting an instant to conceding immediately, if the opponent concedes
with positive probability. Therefore, either cB = 1 or cS = 1. Second, once the opponent
turns out to be the strong type (the commitment type and the buyer with a valuation
lower than p), a player concedes immediately. Therefore, GS(t ) = 1    , GB(t ) =
1 F(p). These two facts uniquely pin down cB and cS.
One apparent difference from Abreu and Gul is the concession rate of the seller. In
AbreuandGul,bothplayershaveconstantconcessionrates. Inmymodel,thebuyerhas
a constant concession rate, while the concession rate of the seller decreases over time.
The constant concession rate of the buyer is due to the fact that there is a single seller
type who needs to be provided with an incentive. The reason for the decreasing con-
cession rate of the seller is that each buyer type has a different marginal cost of waiting.
The intuition is as follows. By the skimming property, a buyer with a higher valuation
concedes earlier. But a buyer with a higher valuation has a higher marginal cost of wait-
ing and, therefore, must be provided with a higher marginal beneﬁt. This can be created
only through a higher concession rate of the seller.
6The marginal beneﬁt of waiting more is independent of the buyer’s valuation and decreases over time,
while the marginal cost is strictly increasing in the buyer’s valuation and is constant over time.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 25
2.3 The Coase conjecture with a single behavioral type
Given p and , there exists a unique sequential equilibrium. Hence the indirect ex-
pected utility of the normal type is well-deﬁned as a function of p and . I denote by
UN(p,) the normal type’s indirect expected utility.
Corollary 1 (The normal type’s indirect expected utility).
UN(p,)=(1 cB)p +cBv,







dv +ln=0 if >(F,p).
Once a war of attrition starts, the normal type is indifferent between waiting and
conceding, and thus her expected payoff is equal to v. The normal type achieves more
than v only when the buyer concedes with positive probability at date 0. The term
(1 cB)p reﬂects that possibility.7
What is the probability that delay occurs? Suppose <(F,p). Then the probability











The ﬁrst term is the probability that the seller is the behavioral type, while the second
term is the probability that the seller is the normal type and offers p.8 It is immediate
that delay occurs whenever  is positive, but disappears as  vanishes.
Corollary 2(TheCoaseconjecturewithasinglebehavioraltype). Whenthereisasingle
behavioral type, the proﬁt implication of the Coase conjecture is robust in a strong sense
(it holds for  small but positive), while the efﬁciency implication is robust in a weak
sense (it holds only when  tends to 0).
2.4 Some useful facts and isoproﬁt curves
Suppose  < (F,p), but the seller offered p. What is the buyer’s posterior belief that
the seller is the commitment type? Since the normal type concedes with probability
(1 =(F,p))=(1 ) at date 0, conditional on the seller not having offered v (having









of the static monopolist who charges p. Intuitively, if the seller is the commitment type almost for sure, the
buyer accepts p immediately whenever his valuation is greater than p.
8The probability that the seller offers v at date 0 is 1   =(F,p). Since the behavioral type does not
concede, the normal type concedes with probability (1 =(F,p))=(1 ).26 KyungMin Kim Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
Intuitively,atthetimewhenawarofattritionstarts,theplayers’bargainingpowersmust
be balanced. When <(F,p), the only way to establish the balance is that the normal
type concedes with positive probability so that the buyer’s posterior belief (the seller’s
bargaining power) increases to (F,p).
Corollary 3. When<(F,p),thebuyer’sbeliefconditionalonthesellerhavingoffered
p at date 0 is equal to (F,p). Therefore, the buyer’s posterior belief conditional on p is
bounded below by (F,p).
Next, consider the game with the rational commitment type. Suppose the rational
commitmenttypeoffersp andthebuyer’sbeliefisgivenbyafterobservingp. Thenthe
subsequent game proceeds exactly in the same way as the one with a single behavioral
type. Therefore, I can interpret the behavioral type in the previous game as the rational
commitmenttypeandcalculatetheindirectexpectedutilityoftherationalcommitment
type as a function of p and . I denote byUR(p,) the rational commitment type’s indi-
rect expected utility. From now on, subscripts N and R refer to the normal type and the
rational commitment type, respectively.














dv +ln=0 if >(F,p).
Relativetothenormaltype’sindirectexpectedutility,UR(p,)containsanadditional
term. This can be interpreted as the cost to the rational commitment type of not being
able to adjust the price.
I maintain the following assumption from now on, where p











Ôp if p Óp
N.
This assumption states that the functions UR(p,1) = (1   F(p))p and UN(p,1) =
(1 F(p))p + F(p)v are single-peaked. A sufﬁcient condition is that the inverse haz-
ard ratio (1 F(p))=f (p) is decreasing, which is frequently employed in the mechanism
design literature.
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Lemma 1. Suppose >(F,p). Then
(i) lim!1cB(p,)= F(p)





The function i,i = N,R is well-deﬁned under Assumption 1. Now let I
p0
i be the level





Lemma 2. Given p0 2(v,p
i ], for each p 2(p0,i(p0)) there exists a unique i 2((F,p),1)
such that (p,i)2 I
p0
i .
Proof. Suppose p 2 (p0,i(p0)). Since Ui(p,(F,p))  v < Ui(p0,1) < Ui(p,1) and
Ui(p,) is continuous, there exists i 2((F,p),1) such that (p,i)2 I
p0
i . It is also unique
becauseUi(p,) is strictly increasing when >(F,p). 
Given Lemma 2, for each p0 2(v,p
i ], the associated isoproﬁt curve is represented by
a function  
p0




i 8p 2[p0,i(p0)]. The continu-
ity of  
p0
i is implied by the continuity ofUi(,).
Theisoproﬁtcurvesonwhicheachtypegetsv playcrucialroleslater. Forthenormal
type, itisstraightforwardtoshowthatasp0 tendstov,  
p0
N (p)convergesto(F,p)forall





(v,v). Then  
v
R(p) 2 ((F,p),1), because UR(p,(F,p)) = v(1 F(p)p=v) < v <UR(p,1)
for p > v. In addition, as p tends to v, for the rational commitment type to achieve v,
cB must be close to F(p) (see Figure 2), and thus  
v
R(p) approaches 1. Intuitively, for the
rational commitment type to achieve v by offering a price close to v, there cannot be
signiﬁcant delay, which happens only when the probability of the commitment type is
sufﬁciently large.
3. Multiple behavioral types
This section studies the game with multiple behavioral types. Let B  [v,v] be the
set of behavioral types.9 The seller is behavioral with probability B. Conditional on
the seller’s being behavioral, the probability measure over the Borel -ﬁeld, F, of B is
given by . For notational simplicity, I assume that  has no mass at v.
Given the results in Section 2, the analysis for multiple behavioral types reduces to
the following simple problem. The normal type plays a mixed strategy, denoted by a
cumulativedistributionfunctionHN over[v,v]. Consumersassignbeliefstoprices;that















Figure 1. Isoproﬁt curves of the normal type.
is, consumers determine  : [v,v] ! [0,1]. The solution (equilibrium) to this reduced-
form problem is (H






and (ii) given H
N (and ),  is the conditional probability that the seller is a com-
mitment type. This reduction is possible because once the seller offers a price p and
consumers’ beliefs are given by , the subsequent dynamics amount to those with a
single behavioral type. Furthermore, as shown in the previous section, the dynamics
have a unique sequential equilibrium and the normal type’s indirect expected utility is
available.
I assume that whatever price is offered by the seller, there is a chance that the seller
is a commitment type. This is an extreme case of a “rich” set of behavioral types.
Assumption 2. ([v,p]) is strictly increasing in p 2(v,v).
One important consequence of this assumption is that there is no off-the-
equilibrium-path price in [v,v], and therefore,  is completely determined by Bayes’
rule. Once either  or H
N is determined, the other follows. Relying on this observation,
I focus on  and do not explicitly derive H
N.
Lemma 3. The set of prices the normal type offers in equilibrium (
N) is [p0,N(p0)] for
some p0 2[v,p

















Figure 2. Isoproﬁt curves of the rational commitment type.
Proof. Suppose p0 2 
N, but p 62 
N for some p 2 (p0,N(p0)). Then the normal type
deviates to p, because UN(p,1) > UN(p0,1)  UN(p0,(p0)). Therefore, [p0,N(p0)] 

N. This establishes the ﬁrst result.
Now suppose 
N = [p0,N(p0)] for some p0 > v, but (p0) < 1. Then for " > 0
sufﬁcientlysmall,UN(p0 ",1)>UN(p0,(p0)),whichcannotbethecaseinequilibrium.
An analogous proof applies to N(p0). 
Suppose that in equilibrium 
N = [p0,N(p0)] for some p0 2 (v,p
N]. A straightfor-
ward but crucial consequence is that (p) =  
p0
N (p) on 
N. That is, for 
N to be the
equilibrium support, the equilibrium beliefs must coincide with the isoproﬁt curve of
the normal type starting from (p0,1) (see Figure 3). This is simply a restatement that in
equilibrium a player is indifferent over all actions in the support of his mixed strategy.
The appropriate p0 is found as follows. Given B and , start from p
N and continu-
ously lower the price. As p0 decreases, the corresponding isoproﬁt curve expands to the
left, encompassing previous isoproﬁt curves (see Figure 1). In order to make  follow
 
p0
N , the normal type must play each price with a speciﬁc probability. Integrating over
the probabilities that the normal type assigns to each price, the integral continuously
increases as p0 decreases. The integral becomes equal to 1 at the proper p0 (the normal
typemustexhaustprobability1). Suchp0 isuniquebecauseisoproﬁtcurvesdonotcross
each other.
If there does not exist such p0 > v, then 
N = [v,v]. That is, the normal type mixes
over all prices in [v,v]. In this case, the equilibrium beliefs are given by (p) = (F,p)












Figure 3. A typical equilibrium when B >'(F,) in the model with multiple behavioral types.
are at least (F,p) (see Corollary 3). When 
N = [v,v], the integral over the probabili-
ties the normal type assigns to each price in (v,v] is less than 1. With the remaining
probability, she offers v.
The following quantity plays a role similar to the role played by (F,p) in the previ-









Roughly, '(F,) is an average value of (F,p) with respect to . It can be interpreted
as the bargaining power of the buyer facing behavioral commitment types distributed
according to . As in (F,p), if F ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F0, then '(F,) 
'(F0,). Intuitively, the seller is relatively stronger when she faces a more favorable dis-
tribution of buyer valuations.
Proposition 2. (i) If B  '(F,), then there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in
whichthenormaltypemixesoverallpricesin[v,v]andconsumers’beliefsaregiven
by (p)=(F,p)8p >v. Inthiscase,thenormaltypeearnsthecompetitiveproﬁt.
(ii) If B >'(F,), then there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in which the nor-
mal type mixes over prices in the interval [p0,N(p0)] for some p0 2 (v,p
N) and
consumers’ beliefs coincide with the isoproﬁt curve of the normal type that starts
from p0. In this case, the normal type achieves more than the competitive proﬁt.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 31
Proof. The proof uses the fact that the likelihood ratio of the seller’s being the normal
type to her being a commitment type is a martingale with respect to the distribution of













In words, the aggregate ratio of the normal type to behavioral types (the left-hand side)
must be equal to the expectation of the conditional ratio (the right-hand side).10
Suppose (p) > (F,p) for some p >v. Since UN(p,(p)) > v, for any p00 2 
N,
(p00)>(F,p00) and v 62

















Hence, if B '(F,), then (p)=(F,p)8p >v and 
N =[v,v].












The function J is strictly decreasing, because if p0 < p00 then  
p0
N (p) <  
p00
N (p). In ad-
dition, as p0 tends to v,  
p0
N (p) converges to (F,p) for all p > v. Therefore, the image
of J is [0,(1 '(F,))='(F,)). Hence, for each B > '(F,), there exists a unique cor-
responding p0 2 (v,p
N] such that (1 B)=B = J(p0). By Lemma 3, this is the unique
equilibrium. 













from the mimicking behavior of the normal type. The integrand is the probability that
the normal type assigns to p so that consumers’ conditional beliefs are equal to (F,p).
Hence, the integral is the probability that the normal type offers a price higher than
v at date 0. It is immediate that delay occurs whenever B > 0, but disappears as B
approaches 0.
10The case where both HN and  have densities is particularly easy. Suppose hN and g are the density
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Corollary 5 (The Coase conjecture with multiple behavioral types). When there are
multiple behavioral types, the proﬁt implication of the Coase conjecture is robust in a
strong sense, while the efﬁciency implication is robust in a weak sense.
The reason why the conclusions in the previous section carry over to the case with
multiplebehavioraltypesisthatwhentheunconditionalprobabilityofbehavioraltypes,
B, is small, the probabilities conditional on the seller’s initial offer are small uniformly
over all prices. This relationship is generated by the fact that in equilibrium the normal
type is indifferent over all prices she may offer. Intuitively, if the normal type prefers
one price to other prices, consumers believe that the seller who offers the price is the
normal type with a high probability. This reduces the normal type’s expected payoff
and, therefore, nulliﬁes her preference for the price.
Now suppose the seller is likely to be committed (B > '(F,)). Which prices do
consumers believe are more likely to drop? Consumers are most suspicious when the
selleroffersapricethatisneitherlownorhigh(seeFigure3). Onlyafewconsumersmay
accept a high price. Therefore, if the price is too high, it is unlikely that the seller ratio-
nally set the price. The seller does not beneﬁt a lot from offering a low price. Consumers
believe that the opportunistic seller must have tried a higher price, and consequently,
the seller offering a low price is indeed committed to the price.
Lastly, observe that if B is sufﬁciently high, then the normal type always offers a


















then any price the normal type offers in equilibrium is higher than the static monopoly
price. To see this, suppose B is arbitrarily close to 1. Then, whatever price was offered,
consumers believe that the seller is committed almost for sure and, therefore, accept
the price as long as their valuations are greater than the price. An instant later, the nor-
mal type can lower the price and earn an additional proﬁt. In this scenario, the effective
objective function of the normal type is UN(p,1) = (1   F(p))p + F(p)v, whose maxi-
mum p
N is strictly greater than p
R. Without uncertainty, her ﬂexibility is a curse. With
uncertainty, it may be a blessing.
4. The rational commitment type
In this section, the seller is the rational commitment type with probability R and the
normal type with the complementary probability. Again, I focus on the determination
of equilibrium prices and beliefs. This is possible because the indirect expected utility
of the rational commitment type is available as well (see Corollary 4).
It is always an equilibrium that both types offer the competitive price. This equi-
librium is induced by the most skeptical beliefs of consumers that (p) = (F,p) for
p >v. Under these beliefs, it is optimal for the rational commitment type to offer v. TheTheoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 33
normal type is indifferent over all prices in [v,v], and thus it is rational for her to offer v.
Given these choices, consumers’ beliefs are consistent because any price higher than v
is off the equilibrium path.
For R small, this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. Suppose R  (F) (
(F,v)), but the rational commitment type offers p > v. Then consumers’ beliefs con-
ditional on p, (p), must be greater than (F,p), because v is the lower bound of the
seller’s payoff (she can always offer v), while UR(p,(F,p)) < v. But this is a contradic-
tion for the following reason. On the one hand, for consumers’ beliefs to be greater than
(F,p), the normal type must offer v with positive probability, because (p)>(F,p)
(F)  R. This implies that the equilibrium expected payoff of the normal type is v.
On the other hand, the normal type can achieve more than v by offering p, because
U(p,(p)) > U(p,(F,p)) = v. Consequently, when R  (F), the rational commit-
ment type offers v in equilibrium. Given this, the normal type has no choice but to offer
v as well.
ThecutoffvalueforR belowwhichitistheuniqueequilibriumthatbothtypesoffer
v is greater than (F). When R is slightly greater than (F), the normal type prefers
a price slightly higher than v. On the contrary, the rational commitment type is not
better off by offering a price higher than v. The normal type’s ﬂexibility ensures her v
underanycircumstance,whiletherationalcommitmenttypemustendurealldelaycost
from a war of attrition. Let e (F) be the minimum value of  above which the rational












Then, by the same reasoning as in the previous paragraph, the Coase conjecture holds
up to e (F).
If R  e (F), then there exists another equilibrium. Let P(R) be the set of prices
such that if p 2 P(R) then p > v andUR(p,R)  v. Fix p 2 P(R) and ﬁnd pN 2 (v,p
N)
and pR 2 (v,p
R) such that R =  
pR
R (p) =  
pN
N (p). Then take off-the-equilibrium-path




N (p0)g 8p0 6= p (for example, (p0) = (F,p)
8p0 6= p). Under these beliefs, by construction, p is the optimal price for both types.
Therefore, for any p 2 P(R), there exists a corresponding sequential equilibrium (see
Figure 4).
Proposition 3. (i) Itisalwaysanequilibriumthatbothtypesofferthecompetitiveprice.
For R < e (F), this is the unique sequential equilibrium.
(ii) If R  e (F), then for any p 2 P(R), there exists a corresponding sequential equi-
librium in which both types offer p.
The following result is immediate.
Corollary 6 (The Coase conjecture with the rational commitment type). When the
commitment type is rational, both the proﬁt implication and the efﬁciency implication









Figure 4. The set of equilibria in the model with the rational commitment type.
4.1 Equilibrium selection
The multiplicity of equilibria is driven by the signaling structure of the game at the stage
when the seller decides her initial offer. While the common equilibrium reﬁnements
do not have any power (for example, the intuitive criterion does not exclude any equi-
librium),11 a selection method using behavioral types is quite effective in this game.
The procedure is (1) perturb the game by allowing a small probability of behavioral
types, (2) let the probability approach zero, and (3) evaluate what equilibria survive the
process.
In the full-ﬂedged game, given the equilibrium beliefs , each payoff type ﬁnds her
own optimal price. Hence, the isoproﬁt curve of each type is tangent to the equilibrium
belief function  at her own optimal price (if the optimal price is greater than v). But
whentheprobabilityofbehavioraltypes,B,ispositive,theequilibriumbeliefscoincide
withanisoproﬁtcurveofthenormaltype(seeLemma3andthesubsequentdiscussion).
Therefore, at the optimal price of the rational commitment type, the isoproﬁt curve of
the rational commitment type is tangent to that of the normal type. This property holds
whenever B >0 and, therefore, holds in the limit as B tends to 0.
Figure 5 shows the set of equilibria that survive as B approaches zero. It consists of
two kinds of equilibria. The ﬁrst type is the degenerate one in which both the normal
11Acriterionthathassomeselectionpoweristhatof“undefeated”equilibriumasdeﬁnedbyMailathetal.
(1993). Undefeated is equivalent to Pareto domination in the current game. When there are two equilibria
in which p and p0 are played, the equilibrium with p defeats that with p0 if both types are better off in the
former. If one type is better off but the other type is worse off, the two equilibria are incomparable.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 35






Figure 5. The thick black line is the set of equilibria that survive the selection process.
type and the rational commitment type offer the competitive price. This equilibrium
survives the selection process, because for B small, the most skeptical beliefs of con-
sumers, (p)=(F,p),p >v, induce the rational commitment type to offer v, which in
turn makes the beliefs consistent. The second type is the one in which both types offer
p > v and the isoproﬁt curves of the two types are tangent to each other. These are the
equilibria that are limits of the equilibria in the full-ﬂedged game in which the two pay-
offtypespoolatpriceshigherthanv. Asdiscussedbefore,thepropertythattheisoproﬁt
curves of the two payoff types are tangent to each other is preserved in the limit.
Let b (F)bethelargestvalueofR belowwhichtheisoproﬁtcurvesof thetwopayoff
types are never tangent to each other. In other words, b (F) is the leftmost value of the
contract curve betweenUN andUR.
Proposition 4. (i) If R < b (F), then the only equilibrium that survives the selection
process is the one in which both the normal type and the rational commitment type
offer v. This remains an equilibrium even for R  b (F).
(ii) If R  b (F), then there exists another equilibrium that survives the selection pro-
cess, in which both types offer a higher price than v.
The cutoff value b (F) is greater than e (F). Therefore, restricting attention to the
set of equilibria that survive the selection process, the Coase conjecture is even more




are more restricted when there are behavioral types. Without behavioral types, the only36 KyungMin Kim Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
requirement on off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs is that the equilibrium beliefs must be
to the left of the minimum of the isoproﬁt curves of the two payoff types. This allows
the seller to have rather pessimistic off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs and, consequently,
yields a large set of equilibria. With behavioral types, the seller loses this latitude. Now
 must coincide with an isoproﬁt curve of the normal type and the isoproﬁt curve of
the rational commitment type must be tangent to that of the normal type. This makes
it harder for the two payoff types to coordinate on a price higher than v and, ultimately,
increases the cutoff value.
5. Discussion
5.1 Acquired stubbornness vs. inborn stubbornness
Kambe (1999) introduces two kinds of stubbornness. With “inborn” stubbornness an
agent knows her type before deciding the initial offer, while with “acquired” stubborn-
ness she does not know whether she will be stuck with the initial offer. Kambe argues
that acquired stubbornness can arise either psychologically or economically (reputa-
tionally).
This paper studies inborn stubbornness. Extending the model to incorporate ac-
quired stubbornness is straightforward. The only difference is that the relevant indirect
expected utility of the seller is the weighted sum of the two indirect utility functions.
One feature of acquired stubbornness is that equilibrium is always unique, which is a
trivial consequence of the fact that there is a single decision maker.
5.2 The no gap case
With no gap (v= 0), there are multiple equilibria in the standard problem (see Ausubel
and Deneckere 1989). Therefore, in order to analyze the no gap case, the equilibrium
behavior in case the seller’s type is revealed to be normal needs to be speciﬁed. I focus
on the weak-Markov equilibrium. This case is particularly tractable, because it is the
limit of the unique equilibrium in the gap case, and thus the limit argument can be used
in my problem as well.
Given p and , as v !0, (v)=0 for v <p, andGS(t)=08t. That is, the seller never
lowersthepriceandallconsumerswithhighervaluationsthanp purchaseimmediately.
The driving force of this result is that the normal type becomes more reluctant to con-
cede as the gain from doing so (v) becomes smaller and she has no reason to reveal her
type in the limit. In the limit as v ! 0, the seller always (whether she is the normal type
or the rational commitment type and whether there are behavioral types or not) offers
the static monopoly price and achieves the static monopoly proﬁt.
5.3 Different discount factors: relation with the standard reputation result
Suppose the buyer and the seller have different discount factors, rB and rS, respectively.
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All other results have straightforward extensions. For ﬁxed rB, as rS becomes smaller,
(F,p) decreases, and thus the buyer concedes faster. The robustness results for the
Coase conjecture still hold, but less strongly.
This analysis shows that the standard reputation result still holds in my problem in
terms of discount rates: in the game with behavioral types, for ﬁxed B > 0, there exists
rS > 0 such that if rS  rS then the expected payoff of the normal type is "-close to her
maximum expected payoffUN(p
N,1).
Appendix: The full-fledged game
This appendix studies the game in which both the rational commitment type and be-
havioral types are active. Let N, R, and B be the probabilities that the seller is the
normal type, the rational commitment type, and one of the behavioral types, respec-
tively. I keep the notation and assumptions in Section 2 and 3.
Again I focus on the determination of equilibrium prices and beliefs. A mixed strat-
egyofthetypei sellerisrepresentedbyacumulativedistributionfunctionHi over[v,v],
i =N, R.
Definition 1. A triple (H
N,H
R,) constitutes a sequential equilibrium in the full-






and (ii) given H
N and H
R (and ),  is the conditional probability that the seller is a
commitment type.
Since Lemma 3 applies whenever B >0, once 
N is given,  is uniquely identiﬁed,
and 
R satisﬁes one of the conditions in the following result.





Proof. Suppose there exists p 2 
R  
N. If p 6= p
R, for " small enough, the rational
commitment type has a proﬁtable deviation to either p  " or p +", becauseUR(p,1) is
single-peaked. 
There are three types of equilibria according to 
N: (1) 








N = [v,v] By the discussion in Section 3, if 
N = [v,v], then (p) = (F,p)
8p > v. In this case, the rational commitment type offers v. Given this, the game is es-
sentially equivalent to the one without the rational commitment type. The normal type
plays each price p > v to the extent that (p) = (F,p) and plays v with the remaining



























N At the end of Section 3, I discuss the possibility that the normal
typealwaysoffersapricehigherthanthestaticmonopolyprice, p
R. Thishappenswhen
the probability of behavioral types is sufﬁciently greater than that of the normal type.
The same phenomenon happens in the full-ﬂedged game. If B is sufﬁciently larger
than N, then any price the normal type offers in equilibrium is greater than p
R (see
Figure 6). Then (p
R) = 1 and the rational commitment type obviously chooses p
R. In
turn, the normal type does not offer p
R because she is achieving more than UN(p
R,1)



















N 6= [v,v] Suppose 
N = [p0,N(p0)] for some p0 2(v,p
R]. Since (p) =
 
p0











N () is an isoproﬁt curve of the normal type, this implies that for p00 2 
R, the
isoproﬁt curve of the rational commitment type is tangent to that of the normal type at
(p00, 
p0
N (p00)) (see Figure 7). Let (p0) be the set of optimal prices of the rational com-
mitmenttypegiven(p)= 
p0
N (p). Theset(p0)iswell-deﬁnedbecause 
p0












Figure 7. Case 3 equilibrium.
and connected and UR is continuous. The following lemma provides some necessary
conditions on (p0).
Lemma 5. For any p0 2(v,p
R], if p00 2(p0), then p00 p
R. That is, the rational commit-
ment type never chooses a price higher than p
R. In addition, as p0 tends to p
R or v, for
any p00 2 (p0),  
p0
N (p00) converges to 1. That is, the beliefs associated with prices in (p0)
are close to 1 if p0 is sufﬁciently close to p
R or v.
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Figure 8. A typical shape of the contract curve.





















k(p,)=p f (p) (1 F(p))Ó0 if p Óp
R.
Hence for K(p,)=0, p is less than p
R. This establishes the ﬁrst result.
If p0 is sufﬁciently close to p
R, the rational commitment type chooses (p,) sufﬁ-
ciently close to the global maximizer (p
R,1), and thus  is close to 1 (see Figure 8). (If p0
is equal to p
R, then the rational commitment type obviously chooses (p
R,1).)




is sufﬁciently close to 1 (see Figure 8). 
The argument from this point proceeds as follows. First, I suppose 
N =[p0,N(p0)]
and the rational commitment type chooses prices in (p0). This produces the distribu-
tion of commitment types, including both behavioral types and the rational commit-
ment type. Given this distribution, the problem is equivalent to the one with only be-
havioral types. As in the proof of Proposition 2, it sufﬁces to check whether the ratio of
the normal type to the commitment types is equal to the expectation of the conditional
ratio under the new distribution.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 41
Let p(p0) =argminp2(p0)f 
p0
N (p)g and p(p0) =argmaxp2(p0)f 
p0


















for P 2 F. These are mixed distributions of commitment types, conditional on the ra-
tional commitment type playing p(p0) and p(p0), respectively.
As in the proof of Proposition 2, deﬁne J



































































By deﬁnition,  
p0
R (p(p0))   
p0
R (p(p0)), and thus J
B,R(p0)  J B,R(p0). The minimum
of both J
B,R(p0) and J B,R(p0) is achieved at p
































N (p) is strictly decreasing in p0).
In addition, its value is BC(F,)=(R +B) (see the deﬁnition ofC(F,) in Case 2). Now
deﬁne a correspondence J B,R :(v,p
R]!R+ by
J B,R(p0)=[J B,R(p0), J
B,R(p0)].
Every value in J B,R(p0) can be achieved by putting appropriate weights on p(p0) and
p(p0). In addition, by the Theorem of the Maximum, J B,R is upper hemicontinuous.
A Case 3 equilibrium exists when the ratio of the normal type to the commitment
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0 µBC(F,λ) µB
1−φ(F,λ)





Figure 9. The summary of the full-ﬂedged game.
Proposition 5. (i) (Case 1: degenerate) If N=B  (1   '(F,))='(F,), then there
exists an equilibrium in which 
N =[v,v], (p)=(F,p)8p >v, and 
R =fvg.
(ii) (Case 2: separating) If N=B <C(F,), then there exists an equilibrium in which












N (p) if p 2
N.
(iii) (Case 3: pooling) If BC(F,)N <(R +B)M1,2 then there exists an equilib-
rium in which 
R 








N (p) if p 2
N.
Figure 9 summarizes all the results. When N is sufﬁciently small, the normal type
and the rational commitment type separate. The normal type offers only prices that are
higherthanthestaticmonopolypriceandtherationalcommitmenttypeoffersthestatic
monopoly price. When N is sufﬁciently large, the normal type mixes over all prices in
[v,v] and the rational commitment type offers the competitive price. In between, the
two payoff types pool at prices higher than the competitive price.
When B(1 '(F,))='(F,)  N < (R +B)M1,2, there are multiple equilibria.
This is when the probability of behavioral types is not sufﬁciently high, and thus the
normal type has an incentive to mimic the rational commitment type, while the prob-
ability of the rational commitment type is not sufﬁciently low so that both types can be
better off by coordination. If the rational commitment type offers prices higher than v,
thenthenormaltypeachievesmorethanv bymimickingtherationalcommitmenttype
as well as the behavioral types. The rational commitment type also earns more than v.
If the rational commitment type offers v, the normal type randomizes over [v,v] and
(p) = (F,p). This in turn makes v the optimal price for the rational commitment
type.
For the equilibrium selection in Section 4, let b (F) be the largest value of  below
which the isoproﬁt curves of the two payoff types are never tangent to each other (see
Figure 5). This value is not less than e (F) becauseUR is tangent toUN only in the upperTheoretical Economics 4 (2009) The Coase conjecture 43
contour set of UR(p, 
v
N(p)). In fact, this value is strictly greater than e (F), because if
p0 is sufﬁciently close to v, then the associated beliefs for prices in (p0) are close to 1
(Lemma 5).































and thus MR,B converges to (1   b (F))= b (F). In addition, as B tends to 0, Case 2
becomes empty, while Case 1 covers the interval (0,1]. Given this, the equilibrium selec-
tion exercise in Section 4 is straightforward. Case 1 corresponds to the Coase conjecture
outcome, while Case 3 corresponds to the outcome in which the isoproﬁt curves of the
two payoff types are tangent to each other.
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